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1
MODERN INTRODUCTION
Readings from Classical andContemporary Sources
Revised
Edition
63
Logical Positivism-A Debate
A.
J. Ayer
and
F.
C.
Copleston
Metaphysics, Analytic Philosophy and Science
A
ER:
WELL,
FATHER
OPLESTON,you've asked me to summarize Logical Positivism for you and it's not veryeasy. For one thing, as
I
understand it, Logical Positivism is not a systemof philosophy. It consists rather in a certain technique-a certain kmd ofattitude towards philosophic problems. Thus, one thing which those of uswho are called logical positivists tend to have
in
common is that we denythe possibility of philosophy as a speculative discipline. We should say that
if
philosophy was to be a branch of knowledge, as distinct from the sciences,it would have to consist in logic or in some form of analysis, and ourreason for this would be somewhat as follows. We maintain that you candivide propositions into two classes, formal and empirical. Formal proposi-tions, like those of logic and mathematics, depend for their validity on theconventions of a symbol system. Empirical propositions, on
the
otherhand, are statements of actual or possible observation, or hypotheses,from which such statements can be logically derived; and it is they thatconstitute science in so far as science isn't purely mathematical. Nowour contention is that this exhausts the field of what may be called specu-lative knowledge. Consequently we reject metaphysics, if this be under-stood, as
I
think it commonly has been, as an attempt to gain knowledgeabout the world by non-scientific means. In as much as metaphysicalstatements are not testable by observation, we hold they are not descrip-tive of anything. And from this we should conclude that
if
philosophy isto be a cognitive activity it must be purely critical. It would take theform of trying to elucidate the concepts that were used in science ormathematics or in everyday language.COPLESTON: ell, Professor Ayer,
I
can quite understand, of course,
[This
debate took
place
on the Third Program
of
the
British
Broadcasting Corporation
on
June
13.
1949.
It is here published
for
the
first
time
with the kind permission
of
ProfesSoI
Ayer
and Father C0~1eston.j
LOGICAL
POSITIVISM-A
DEBATE
-727i
philosophers confining themselves to logical analysis if they wish to doso, and
I
shouldn't dream of denying or of belittling in any way its utility:
I
think it's obviously an extremely useful thing to do to analyse andclarify the concepts used in science.
In
everyday life, too, there aremany terms used that practically have taken on an emotional connota-tion-"progressive" or "reactionary" or "freedom" or "the modern mind":-to make clear to people what's meant or what they mean by those terms,or the various possible meanings, is a very useful thing. But
if
the LogicalPositivist means that logical analysis is the only function of philosophy-that's the point at which
I
should disagree with
him.
And so would manyother philosophers disagree~especially n the Continent. Don't you thinkthat by saying what philosophy is, one presupposes a philosophy, or takesup a position as a philosopher? For example,
if
one divides significantpropositions into two classes, namely, purely formal propositions and state-ments of observation, one is adopting a philosophical position: one isclaiming that there are no necessary propositions which are not purelyformal. Moreover, to claim that metaphysical propositions, to be significant,should be verifiable as scientific hypotheses are verifiable is to claim thatmetaphysics, to be significant, should not be metaphysics.AYER:Yes,
I
agree that my position is philosophical, but not that itis metaphysical, as
I
hope to show later. To say what philosophy is, iscertainly a philosophical act, but by this
I
mean that it is itself a ques-tion of philosophical analysis. We have to decide, among other things,what it is that we are going to call "philosophy" and
I
have given youmy answer. It is not, perhaps, an obvious answer but it at least has themerit that it rescues philosophical statements from becoming either mean-ingless or trivial. But
I
don't suppose that we want to quarrel about howwe're going to use a word, so much as to discuss the points underlyingwhat you've just said. You would hold,
I
gather, that in
the
account
I
gaveof the possible fields of knowledge something was left out.COPLESTON:es.AYER:And that which is left out is what people called philosophersmight well be expected to study?COPLESTON: es,
I
should hold that philosophy, at any rate meta-physical philosophy, begins, in a sense, where science leaves off. In mypersonal opinion, one of the chief functions of metaphysics is to openthe mind to the Transcendent-to remove the ceilmg of the room, as itwere, the room being the world as amenable to scientific handling andinvestigation. But this is not to say that the metaphysician is simply con-cerned with the Transcendent. Phenomena themselves (objects of whatyou would probably call "experience") can be considered from the meta-physical angle. The problem of universals, for instance, is a metaphysicalproblem.
I
say that metaphysical philosophy begins,
m
a
sense, wherescience leaves off, because
I
do not mean to imply that the metaphysiciancannot begin until science has finished its work. If this were so, themetaphysician would be quite unable to start.
I
mean that he asks other
a728t
MEANING, VERIFICATION
AND
METAPHYSICSquestions than those asked by the scientist and pursues a different method.AVER: To say that philosophy begins where science leaves off isperfectly all right
if
you mean that the philosopher takes the results of thescientist, analyses them, shows the logical connection of one propositionwith another, and so on. But if you say that it leaps into a quite differentrealm-the realm which you describe as the "transcendent"-then
I
think
I
cease to follow you. And
I
thmk
I
can explain why
I
cease to foilowyou.
I
hold a principle, known as the principle of verification, according towhich a statement intended to be a statement of fact is meaningful only
if
it's either formally valid, or some kind of observation is relevant to its truthor falsehood. My difficulty with your so-called transcendent statements isthat their truth or falsehood doesn't, it seems to me, make the slightestdifference o anything that any one experiences.COPLESTON: don't care for the phrase "transcendent statement."
I
think myself that some positive descriptive statements about the Tran-scendent are possible; but, leaving that out of account,
I
think that oneof the possible functions of the philosopher (a function which you pre-sumably exclude) is to reveal the limits of science as a complete andexhaustive description and analysis of reality.AYER:Limits of science? You see
I
can quite well understand yoursaying that science is limited if you mean only that many more things maybe discovered. You may say, for example, that the physics of the seven-teenth century was limited in so far as physicists of the eighteenth, nine-teenth and twentieth centuries have gone very much further.COPLESTON: o,
I
didn't mean that at all. Perhaps
I
can illustratewhat
I
mean in reference to anthropology. The biochemist can describeMan within his own terms of reference and up to a certain extent. But,although biochemistry may doubtless continue to advance, I see no reasonto suppose that the biochemist will be able to give an exhaustive analysis ofMan. The psychologist certainly would not think so. Now, one of thepossible functions of a philosopher is to show how all these scientificanalyses of man-the analyses of the biochemist, the empirical psychologistand so on-are unable to achieve the exhaustive analysis of the individualhuman being. Karl Jaspers, for example, would maintain that Man as free,i.e. precisely as free, cannot be adequately handled by any scientist whopresupposes the applicability of the principle of deterministic causality andconducts his investigations with that presupposition in mind.
I
am
not afollower of Karl Jaspers; but
I
think that to call attention to what he calls
Existenz
is a legitimate philosophical procedure.
Metaphysical and Scientific Explanation
AVER: do not see that you can know
a
priori
that human bebaviouris inexplicable. The most you can say is that our present stock of psy-chological hypotheses isn't adequate to explain certain features of it: and
!
LOGICAL
POSITMSM-A
DEBATE
n729's.
you may very well be right. But what more is required is better psycbologi-cal investigation. We need to form new theories and test the theories byfurther observation, which is again the method of science. It seems to methat all you've said, when you've talked of the limits of science, is simplythat a given science may not explain things, or explain as much as youwould like to see explained. But that, which to me seems to be perfectlyacceptable, is only a historical statement about a point which science hasreached at a given stage. It doesn't show that there's room for a quitedifferent kmd of discipline, and you haven't made clear to me what thatdifferent kind of discipline which you reserve for the philosopher is sup-posed to be,COPLESTON:Well,
I
think that one of the possible functions of thephilosopher is to consider what is sometimes called the non-empiricalor intelligible self. There is an obvious objection, from your point of view,against the phrase "nou-empirical self"; but
I
would like to turn tometaphysics in general. The scientists can describe various particular aspectsof things, and all the sciences together can give, it is true, a very generaldescription of reality. But the scientist, precisely as scientist, does not raise,for example, the question why anything is there at all. To raise thisqnestion is, in my opinion, one of the functions of the philosopher. Youmay say that the qnestion cannot be answered.
I
think that it can; but,even
if
it could not be answered,
I
consider that it is one of the functions ofthe philosopher to show that there is such a problem. Some philosopherswould say that metaphysics consists in raising problems rather than inanswering them definitively; and, though
I
do not myself agree with thesheerly agnostic position,
I
thmk that there is value in raising the meta-physical problems, quite apart from the question whether one can or can-not answer them definitively. That is why
I
said earlier on that one of thefunctions of the philosopher is to open the mind to the Transcendent, totake the ceiling off the room-to use again a rather crude metaphor.AYER: Yes, but there's a peculiarity about these "why" questions.Supposing someone asks you "Why did the ligbt go out?" You may tellhim the ligbt went out because there was a fuse. And he then says "Whydoes the light go out when it is fused?" Then perhaps you tell him a storyabout electrical connections, wires, and so on. That is the "how" story.Then, if he's not satisfied with that, you may give him the general theoryof electricity which is again a "how" story. And then
if
he's not satisfiedwith that, you give him the general theory of electromagnetics, which isagain a "how" story. You tell him that thmgs function in this way at thislevel, and then your "why" answers are deductions from that. So that inthe ordinary sense of a "why" question, putting a "why" question is askingfor a "how" answer at a higher logical level-a more general "how"answer. Well now if you raise this question with regard to the world as awhole, you're asking for what? The most general possible theory?COPLESTON:o, the metaphysical question I have in mind is a differentsort of question. If I ask, for example, how the earth comes to be in its
w730a
MEANING,
VERIFICATION AND
METAPHYSICS
present condition,
I
expect an answer which refers to empirical causes andconditions. There
I
quite agree with you.
I
go to the astronomer for ananswer. And if one persists in asking such questions,
I
dare say one could,in theory, go back indefinitely. At least,
I
am prepared to admit the possi-bility. But if
I
ask why there are phenomena at all, why there is somethingrather than nothmg,
I
am not asking for an answer in terms of empiricalcauses and conditions. Even
if
the series of phenomena did go backindefinitely, without beginning,
I
could still raise the question as to why theinfinite series of phenomena exists, how it comes to be there. Whethersuch a question can be answered or not is obviously another matter. But if
I
ask whether anything lies behind phenomena, whether anything isresponsible for the series, finite or infinite, of phenomena, the answer-supposing that there is an answer-must, in my opinion, refer to a realitybeyond or behind phenomena. But in any case to ask why any finitephenomena exist, why there is something rather than nothing, is to ask adifferent sort of question from the question why water tends to flowdownhill rather than uphill.AYER:But my objection is that your very notion of an explanation ofall phenomena is self-contradictory.COPLESTON:hat is the contradiction?AYER:The contradiction is,
I
think, that
if
you accept my interpreta-tion of what "why" questions are, then asking a "why" question isalways asking for a more general description; and asking for the "why" ofthat is asking for a more general description still.
And
then you say,"Give me an answer to a 'why' which doesn't take the form of a descrip-tion," and that's a contradiction. It's like saying "Give me a descriptionmore general than any description, which itself is not a description." Andclearly nobody can do that.COPLESTON: hat is not the question
I
am
asking. There would be acontradiction if
I
did not distinguish between a scientific question and ametaphysical question, but a metaphysical question concerns the intelligiblestructure of reality in so far as it is
not
amenable to the investigation by themethods of empirical science. It seems to me that when
I
propose a meta-physical question you ask me to re-state the question as though it were ascientific question. But,
if
I
could do that, the question would not be ametaphysical question, would it?AYER:Well, what form would your metaphysical question take?COPLESTON:Well, in my opinion, the existence of phenomena ingeneral requires some explanation, and
I
should say explanation in termsof a transcendent reality.
I
maintain that this is a possible philosophicalquestion. Whatever the answer may be, it obviously cannot consist in afurther description of phenomena. Aristotle asserted that philosophy beginswith wonder.
If
someone feels no wonder at the existence of the physicalworld, he is unlikely to ask any questions about its existence as such.AVER:
If
you say anything of that kind, it still means that you'retreating your transcendent reality, or rather the statements about yourLOGICAL POSITIVISM-A
DEBATE
>731<
transcendent reality, in the same way as a scientific hypothesis. It becomesa very, very general scientific hypothesis. Only you want to say it's not likea scientific hypothesis. Why not?
I
suppose it's because you can't test it inany way. But if you can't test it in any way, then you've not got an explana-tion and you haven't answered my question.COPLESTON: ell, at this point
I
should like to remark that you'represupposing that one must be able to test every hypothesis in a certainway.
I
do not mean to allow that every metaphysical statement is ahypothesis; but even
if
it were, it would not he scientifically testable withoutceasing to be a metaphysical statement. You seem to me to reject from thebeginning the reflective work of the intellect on which rational metaphysicsdepends. Neither Spinoza nor Fichte nor Hegel nor St. Thomas Acquinassupposed that one could investigate scientifically what they respectivelybelieved to be the metaphenomenal reality. But each of them thought thatintellectual reflection can lead the mind to postulate that reality.AYER: Well in one sense of the words, of course it can. You canpenetrate disguises.
If
something's heavily camouflaged you can under-stand that it's there even
if
you can't see it. That's because you know whatit would be like to see it independently of seeing it in disguise. Now yourkind of penetration is a very queer one, because you say you can discernthings lying behind other thmgs with simply no experience of stripping offthe disguise and coming across the thing undisguised.COPLESTON:t's not exactly a question of a disguise.
I
can strip offcamouflage and see the camouflaged thing with my eyes. But no meta-physician would pretend that one could see a metaphenomenal reality withthe eyes: it can be apprehended only by an intellectual activity, though thatactivity must, of necessity, begin with the objects of sense-experience andintrospection. After all, you yourself
reflect
onthe data of experience: yourphilosophy does not consist in stating atomic experiences.AYER:No indeed it doesn't. Since
I
hold that philosophy consists inlogical analysis, it isn't
in
my view a matter of stating experiences at all:
if
by stating experiences you mean just describing them.COPLESTON:t seems to me that we are discussing my particular brandof metaphysics rather than Logical Positivism. However,
I
should maintainthat the very ability to raise the question of the existence of the world (orof the series of phenomena,
if
you like) implies a dim awareness of thenon-self-sufficiency of the world. When this awareness becomes articulateand finds expression, it may lead to a metaphysical speculation, to a con-scious thinking of contingent existence
as
such.
And
I
should maintainthat an intellectual apprehension of the nature of what
I
call contingentbeing as such involves an apprehension of its relatedness to self-groundedBeing. Some philosophers (Hegel among them,
I
think) would hold thatone cannot think finite being
as such
without implicitly thmking theInfinite. The words "as such" are,
I
should say, important.
I
can perfectlywell think of a cow, for example, without thinking of any metaphysical
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